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should be. This paper examines the projections of protectionists in the debate 
surrounding a proposed reciprocity agreement between the United States and British 
North America over the period 1846-1854 as a case study. The protectionist prophesies 
on both sides of the border were found not to be supported by the evidence from the 
subsequent period of reciprocity. A number of reasons for the inaccuracy of the 
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Introduction 
H 
istorians often complain that the lessons of history are ignored. Sometimes, 
however, the lessons of history are difficult to extract from the record of events. 
One example may be the cachet that continues to be attached to protectionist 
arguments despite the general acceptance of the benefits of more open systems of 
international trade. While it is understandable why vested interests that perceive that 
they have something to lose from trade liberalisation will fight to prevent that loss 
from occurring, it is harder to understand why their arguments are accepted by the 
public and decision makers
1. Even after over fifty years of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the international 
trade landscape is still littered with trade barriers and new encumbrances continue to 
arise, particularly in the form of non-tariff barriers and through the strategic use of 
contingent protection mechanisms
2.  Proposals for new regional trade agreements are 
met with a flurry of protectionist activity
3 while WTO negotiations face cleverly 
disguised protectionist arguments from both developed and developing countries
4. 
One (but certainly not the only) reason why protectionist arguments are so persuasive, 
however, is that they are seldom directly refuted. 
There are a number of reasons why one so seldom sees the arguments of 
protectionists refuted. Part of the reason is that protectionists long ago lost the 
intellectual battle regarding the “general good” arguments surrounding trade 
liberalisation/protection
5. Attempts are still made, however, to dress up protectionism 
in welfare enhancing clothing (e.g. over environmental or labour standards) to give it 
intellectual credibility but, in general, protectionist arguments are made on a different 
level
6. In other words, protectionist arguments are made on a sectoral, industry or 
enterprise level – i.e. so many jobs lost, firms relocating, factories closing, etc. Claims 
of expected losses of these types are difficult to refute. They can only be refuted ex 
post to a change in the trading regime. 
Protectionist arguments are presented when a change in the international trading 
regime is being proposed. They are meant to forestall the proposed change. If the 
arguments of protectionists are persuasive, the change in international trading regime 
does not take place. As a result, the prophesies/projections of the protectionists cannot 
be tested ex post because there has been no change in the international trade regime. 
Hence, protectionists’ claims can be made with impunity
7. Only if the change in the 
international trade regime is actually accepted and implemented is it possible to 
examine the ex ante claims of protectionists. 
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Even when a change in the international trading regime takes place, the 
protectionists arguments may not be examined to discern if they represented an 
accurate portrayal of the state of the sector, industry or enterprise in the post change 
environment. In part, the lack of interest in examining the projections of the 
protectionists once liberalisation has been accomplished is that for those interested in 
liberalisation, the battle has already been won. There is nothing to be gained from 
such an examination in relation to the particular issue that was being debated prior to 
the change. However, the failure to carry out these examinations may make it easier 
for protectionists to bring forth similar arguments the next time trade liberalisation 
ends up on the policy agenda. 
Protectionists, of course, might have an incentive to undertake an assessment if 
they could be assured that the result would support future cases. Given how seldom 
such assessments are actually undertaken, one may be drawn to the conclusion that the 
projections made by protectionists may not, in general, be confirmed. 
One of the problems with providing an assessment of protectionists’ projections is 
that they are very difficult to do. Changes in trade regimes take time to work their way 
through the economy. Often, new trade regimes have pre-specified phase in periods so 
that the effects of a change are not fully manifest for ten or fifteen years. A large 
number of shocks to economic systems will take place during the period over which 
the changes to the international trade regime are being implemented. As a result, it is 
very difficult to impose ceteris paribus conditions so that the effects of the change in 
the international trade regime can be isolated from the other economic forces at work. 
In particular, the general equilibrium nature of the problem presents a significant 
challenge for economic modelling. 
The gains from trade liberalisation are expected to arise from the movement of 
resources out of relatively less efficient industries into more efficient industries – 
changes in international trade patters only follow changes in resource use. 
Economists’ ability to model the movement of resources among sectors is only poorly 
developed and, as a result, most computable general equilibrium (CGE) models either 
capture only the first round effects of trade liberalisation – before resources begin to 
move among sectors – or “use ad hoc specifications for functional relationships”
8. 
Given the difficulties associated with isolating the effects of trade liberalisation and 
modelling the liberalisation process, it is probably not surprising that so few 
evaluations are undertaken. Further, the CGE models tend to be developed on a very 
aggregate level while protectionist projections are often made on an individual 
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product or market basis
9. This suggests that examining protectionist arguments will 
have to be done on a commodity-by-commodity basis. 
Undertaking an evaluation of protectionist arguments on an individual commodity 
basis, however, can be a significant task. First, the current array of tradable goods is 
vast and not all products can be examined leading to the possibility of selection bias. 
Further, there is no place where protectionist statements are conveniently collected so 
that a considerable effort would have to be expended in acquiring a representative 
sample of views. On the other hand, not to make the effort is to leave protectionist 
predictions untested and open for further unchallenged use
10. Given the apparent 
importance of protectionist pressure in trade policy making
11, a preliminary effort to 
establish whether the approach is feasible is warranted. 
Reciprocity Between the United States and British 
North America as a Case Study 
O 
ne way to make this type of research more tractable is to find a proposal for 
trade liberalisation that is limited in product scope – thus limiting the array of 
goods to be examined. One successful attempt to liberalise trade that was limited in 
product scope was the agreement on reciprocity in agricultural products that was 
negotiated in 1854 between British North America and the United States and 
remained in force until 1866. The list of products to which reciprocity was extended 
was comprised of only forty-two items
12. Of the forty-two products on the list of 
reciprocity items, sixteen were very minor commodities with values of trade less than 
£10,000
13. The list of 26 products includes the main tradable agricultural products 
such as grains, flour, livestock, meat, seeds, fish, poultry, eggs, hides and pelts, furs, 
butter, timber and lumber and sheepskins. 
The reciprocity treaty has some other attributes that made it particularly attractive 
to study. Reciprocity meant the immediate elimination of tariffs rather than the phase 
down of tariffs that is typical in modern trade agreements. This means that the effects 
on trade flow are immediate, reducing to some extent the ceteris paribus problems 
associated with liberalisation that takes place over a long phase-in period. There is 
also good consistent data on trade flows both prior to the reciprocity agreement being 
signed and for the first three years it was in force
14 – when the majority of, at least, the 
first round effects on trade flows would be expected given the immediate elimination 
of tariffs on reciprocity items. The early post agreement years were also politically 
stable and exhibited moderate economic growth, conditions where economic actors 
could be expected to act upon opportunities provided by the removal of trade barriers. 
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In the latter period of the reciprocity era, the Civil War in the United States 
destabilised domestic politics and moved its economy away from equilibrium. 
Britain’s apparent support of the Confederate States had a detrimental effect on 
relations between British North America and the United Stares. These events 
increased business risk and likely inhibited investments in trade related activities. The 
agreement was unilaterally terminated by the United States in 1866. 
While either side in a trade debate may have an incentive to mislead their 
audience, there is no way to know their true motivations. Hence, not to impute 
motives to protagonists, their statements must be taken at face value – i.e. that they 
believe what they are saying. If they are wrong in their assessment of the future, the 
question that then arises is; why? 
On a commodity specific basis, protectionism must rest on an expectation of 
financial loss that is the result of an assessment of the differences between the two 
economies prior to liberalisation.  Perhaps the most obvious basis for an assessment of 
this nature is the relative prices of similar products in the two national markets.  The 
evidence from the protectionist arguments surrounding reciprocity appears to support 
this hypothesis. 
The protectionist’s perception is that, as the industry or firm is located in the high 
priced country, there will be an inflow of less costly imports leading to a decline in 
prices.  Firms will be forced to exit and the industry will shrink. On the surface, this 
scenario appears logical and consistent. 
The protectionists’ perception of current market conditions may, however, be 
incorrect. There are at least five reasons for having a false perception of the pre-
liberalisation transnational business environment. The first is that the relative prices 
may not be as perceived.  That is, the protectionist has imperfect information and the 
industry/firm does not actually operate in the high cost country once prices plus 
transportation costs are accurately accounted for. 
Second, there is an implicit assumption made by protectionists that the low cost 
country can increase its production sufficiently at current costs to flood the importer’s 
market and drive prices down.  It may be, however, very expensive for the exporting 
country to bring additional resources into the low cost industry.  In this case, rather 
than large amounts of increased exports, the “low cost” industry finds that instead 
there is an increase in prices. Producers in the exporting country benefit at the expense 
of their consumers. 
Third, goods may not be competitively priced in the importing country.  In other 
words, the prices in the importing country reflect not only costs but also an additional 
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premium due to the existence of market power.  A reduction in tariffs may well lead to 
a decrease in price but only a reduction in profits rather than bankruptcy.  There will 
be no exit of firms or major loss of jobs in this case.  
The fourth reason stems from the faulty perception that the envisioned differences 
in costs apply to the entire range of commodities produced by an industry and that 
these differences will not change over time.  While it is the specialisation in 
production that provides the gains from trade, it is often perceived that this will occur 
through the wholesale bankruptcy of entire industries (e.g. that the meat packing 
industry will disappear).  In many cases, however, it is the specialisation within an 
industry’s range of goods where the gains from trade can be made. 
The fifth reason why the protectionist vision may be incorrect is that there can be 
sufficient market expansion occurring to accommodate both domestic and extra 
foreign supplies. In this case the domestic industries may grow less than if they were 
protected but there would be no significant loss of existing jobs or bankruptcies. 
Hence, there are several reasons why the protectionist vision may be wrong.  Of 
course, the vision may also turn out to be correct.  Ex post, once an agreement has 
been implemented, the resulting changes in economic activity will either support or 
reject the initial publicly espoused position.  In the latter case, each of the possible 
reasons why the protectionist’s vision was inaccurate would be supported by different 
economic events. 
A correct vision by protectionists would be supported by the following set of 
stylised facts: - bankruptcies, reduced employment and reduced output in the 
importing country. If there was imperfect information on relative prices (Reason1), 
then the supporting evidence would be: - no significant change in trade or changes in 
trading patterns contrary to those predicted. If expansion in the exporting country is 
difficult (Reason 2), then one would observe: - price increases in the exporting 
country. When market power exists and goods in the importing country are not priced 
at cost (Reason 3), one would expect: - decrease in prices in the importing country but 
no bankruptcies and only limited loss of employment. If liberalisation leads to within 
industry specialisation and intra-industry trade (Reason 4), then there will be: - 
increased trade volumes within the trading category, no decrease in employment and 
output or increases in bankruptcies. A general market expansion (Reason 5) means 
that: - market growth in the importing country exceeds the increase in imports. Data 
on all of these economic events is normally readily available, often historically. Thus, 
once the protectionist positions are identified and the change in the trade patterns 
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tabulated, it is relatively straight forward to determine whether or not protectionists 
were correct, and in the cases where they were wrong, why they were wrong. 
The protectionist arguments on both sides of the border are reported in detail in 
the Technical Annex. A few examples are presented here. In some cases, such as 
grains, the same arguments were made on both sides of the border simultaneously. For 
example, in a letter to the New York Herald it was claimed that: 
… the influx of Canadian grain will be so great (should the bill pass) that 
our growers will be forced out of the markets....
15  
In Canada, the prophesy for grain was that: 
Why the Canadian would have been driven out of the field by 
underselling.
16 
In the case of live animals, Mr. Brooks speaking in the debates over reciprocity in the 
legislature of United Canada stated: 
The theory (reciprocity)... might be a good one, but when put in practice, 
in the case of cattle, it was a most injurious one
17. 
In the case of wool, Canadians were told to expect the worst. 
He would have been happy to hear that the hon. member explains what 
effect this resolution would have on creating a market for wool, a most 
important matter to the agriculturalist... he was convinced it would bring 
our agriculturalist in competition with farmers of the United States – a 
competition which could not be anything but ruinous
18. 
For the most part, the protectionist statements were as straight forward as those 
presented above, asking for protection on the basis of threatened self-interest arising 
from increased competition for individual commodities. Further investigations, 
reported fully in the Technical Annex, show that none of the protectionist prophesies 
came to pass. The results of these investigations for eight major commodities to which 
reciprocity was applied are summarized in Table 1. The protectionist prophesies failed 
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Table 1  Protectionist Prophesies for Major Reciprocity Commodities 
 
Commodity  Origin of 
Protectionist 
Claim 
              Prophesy Not Fulfilled 








Grain Canada Reason  1  Inaccurate Relative 
Prices 













Meat  Canada  Reason 4  Market Growth 
Butter Canada  Reason  1  Inaccurate Relative 
Prices 
Cheese  Canada  Reason 5  Market Growth 
Coal United 
States 
Reason 2  Constraints on 
increased supply 
Wool Canada Reason  4  Intra-industry 
Specialisation 
Note: No protectionist claims were identified for: seeds, vegetables, dried fruit, 
undried fruit, fish, eggs, hides and pelts, furs, marble, tallow, lard, ores, 
ashes, timber and lumber, firewood, plants, shrubs and trees, sheepskins, 
fish oil, or flax. References to protection for tobacco were found but were 
too vague to analyse. 
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Conclusions 
P 
roposals for trade liberalisation are often, if not always, the subject of 
considerable debate. Both sides in these debates must base their arguments on a 
vision of market conditions after trade barriers are removed in the future. Forecasting 
the future, particularly after a major structural change such as the removal of trade 
barriers is a difficult task, and results are open to criticism. Given the complexities of 
the general equilibrium nature of trade liberalisation and lags in adjustments and 
implementation, ex post evaluations are also difficult. In the latter case, this often 
means that evaluations are not undertaken, in part because the arguments have already 
been won or lost. The end result is, however, that the claims made by parties active in 
the debate are not substantiated nor refuted. Given that these ex ante arguments may 
be persuasive in the debates, however, having information on their accuracy should be 
of interest. 
The arguments of the protagonists of trade liberalisation tend to be couched in 
macro terms related to creation of jobs and increased economic growth. On a very 
practical level, projections of growth in exports of particular commodities are seldom 
made explicitly because they provide evidence that can be used by the opponents of 
liberalisation. On the other hand, protectionist arguments are often based on 
projections for particular commodities that are perceived to be at risk. 
If protectionist arguments win the day and no liberalisation takes place, it is not 
possible to judge the accuracy of the arguments of either side. If liberalisation goes 
ahead, however, protectionist prophesies can be examined. In the case of the 1854 
reciprocity treaty between the United States and British North America, the 
protectionist prophesies do not appear to have been fulfilled. Five reasons for this 
failure have been identified: inaccurate relative price information, constrains of 
expansion of supply, the existence of market power, intra-industry specialisation and 
market expansion. Those wishing to examine the statements of protectionists in future 
debates may wish to examine the prophesies in light of these reasons. Relative prices, 
constraints on the expansion of supply and the existence of market power in importing 
countries can be investigated relatively easily. The potential for intra-industry 
specialisation and market expansion post liberalisation will be more difficult, but not 
impossible to, forecast and argue effectively. 
The examination of the reciprocity agreement of 1854 suggests that this avenue of 
research may be worth pursuing as a means to better assess the arguments of 
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protectionists in debates over trade liberalisation. Of course, the prophesies of those 
arguing the case for liberalisation also need to be assessed. 
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